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Abnormal Returns from Takeover Prediction 
Modelling: Challenges and Suggested Investment 
Strategies 
  
Abstract 
While takeover targets earn significant abnormal returns, studies tend to find no abnormal 
returns from investing in predicted takeover targets. In this study, we show that the difficulty 
of correctly identifying targets ex ante does not fully explain the below-expected returns to 
target portfolios. Target prediction models’ inability to optimally time impending takeovers, 
by taking account of pre-bid target underperformance and the anticipation of potential targets 
by other market participants, diminishes but does not eliminate the potential profitability of 
investing in predicted targets. Importantly, we find that target portfolios are predisposed to 
underperform, as targets and distressed firms share common firm characteristics, resulting in 
the misclassification of a disproportionately high number of distressed firms as potential 
targets. We show that this problem can be mitigated, and significant risk-adjusted returns can 
be earned, by screening firms in target portfolios for size, leverage and liquidity. 
 
       
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14, G34 
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1. Introduction 
A large number of studies show that takeover targets experience significant stock 
price increases around merger announcements. Jensen and Ruback (1983), one of the first 
systematic reviews of the mergers & acquisitions (M&A) literature, reports weighted average 
abnormal returns of 29.1 percent for US targets in the month or two surrounding an offer. A 
comparative study by Franks and Harris (1989) based on UK data reports abnormal returns of 
a similar magnitude. More recent studies employing US, UK and EU samples (e.g., Georgen 
and Renneboog, 2004; Danbolt, 2004; Gregory and O’Donohoe, 2014) show comparable 
abnormal returns to targets, ranging from 19.5 to 31 percent in the days and months 
surrounding a bid.  
Unsurprisingly, a number of studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; Brar et al., 
2009) explore whether a successful investment strategy can be developed by predicting 
potential targets. However, these studies report limited success despite finding that prediction 
models are fairly successful in identifying future targets. Powell (2001), for example, finds 
that the market- and size-adjusted returns to his UK target portfolio between 1st January 1996 
and 31st December 1996 were -11.0 and -4.0 percent, respectively. Mirroring the conclusions 
of earlier studies, such as Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1999), Powell (2001, p. 1008) contends 
that ‘developing statistical models to predict takeover targets is unlikely to result in a 
profitable investment strategy’. However, a small number of recent studies have reported that 
the generation of abnormal stock returns from takeover prediction is feasible. Using a small 
sample of Australian listed firms, Rodrigues and Stevenson (2013), for example, find that 
their model performs in line with the market in 2009, but outperforms the market in 2010 and 
2011 when simple market-adjusted returns are considered. Their results are, however, only 
adjusted for risk using a simple market-adjusted returns model. To our knowledge, the most 
optimistic results have been reported by Brar et al. (2009). Their study, based on an EU 
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sample, shows that a ‘takeover timing portfolio’ generates a modest alpha of 0.58 percent per 
month between 1995 and 2003 (Brar et al., 2009, p. 448). As discussed below, one potential 
reason for the gains reported by Brar et al. (2009) is the size restriction they impose by 
focusing on deals involving targets with market capitalisation in excess of $100 million. 
Our paper is motivated by the finding that target prediction models have some 
predictive ability (at least, better than random classification); targets gain substantially from 
takeover activity, yet portfolios of predicted targets fail to outperform the market. We 
contribute to the literature in two broad areas. First, we explore the underlying factors that 
influence the stock returns of predicted target portfolios. Amongst these are issues of poor 
timing, prediction errors and the tendency for distressed firms to be identified as potential 
targets. Second, we investigate potential strategies for mitigating the effects of these factors.  
In particular, we show that by screening firms in target portfolios for size, leverage and 
liquidity, the effect of distressed firms can be reduced and significant abnormal returns can be 
generated from the investment strategy. 
With respect to the factors influencing target portfolio stock returns, we highlight 
three potential reasons why portfolios generated from takeover prediction models fail to 
generate abnormal returns, and we investigate these by developing nine testable hypotheses. 
First, we examine the predictive ability of current prediction models and whether the 
prediction models’ inability to correctly predict a substantial number of future targets 
explains the low returns to target portfolios (as suggested by Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1999; 
Powell, 2001, 2004; Cahan et al., 2011). Prediction models underperform if the predicted 
targets (or firms with high takeover likelihood) do not eventually receive takeover bids. Prior 
studies suggest that these firms (described as type II errors) are strategically better off if 
acquired. Given that takeover targets generally underperform prior to takeovers (Palepu, 
1986; Powell, 2001), the expectation is that such firms are likely to continue to underperform 
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unless they become a takeover target. The presence of type II errors in the portfolio of 
predicted targets will, perhaps, explain a substantial portion of the low returns to these 
portfolios. We hypothesise that (i) type II errors underperform the typical non-target 
(hypothesis 1); and (ii) target portfolios stripped of type II errors earn significant abnormal 
returns (hypothesis 2). If the presence of type II errors explains the low returns to target 
portfolios, then the literature will benefit from the development of better prediction models.  
Second, we explore the challenge of optimal timing in target prediction, and whether 
poor timing in prediction potentially explains the low returns to target portfolios. The 
challenge arises from the finding that targets tend to perform poorly over several months 
prior to the bid announcement, but start to generate significant returns as the announcement 
date draws closer (we confirm this later in our study). This suggests that holding targets later 
rather than sooner might be of some benefit. Nonetheless, other market participants are likely 
to anticipate potential takeover bids as the bid date draws near, thus reducing any abnormal 
returns to be generated from the strategy. To our knowledge, our study is the first to consider 
the significance of timing when predicting takeover targets. 
To elaborate, optimal timing is hampered, as target prediction models employ firm 
fundamental values; therefore, annual portfolio rebalancing is used in takeover prediction 
modelling (see, for example, Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1999; Powell, 2001; Powell and Yawson, 
2007; Cremers et al., 2009; Brar et al., 2009). However, the predictions may be may be made 
so early that the stock returns of targets experience a significant decrease before the pre-bid 
upward movement in stock price commences. We might, therefore, find very low returns to 
correctly predicted targets. Further, takeover prediction models exist in the public domain, 
and other market participants are likely to employ similar strategies. We should, therefore, 
expect to find evidence of market anticipation of predicted targets. We hypothesise that the 
returns to actual targets in target portfolios are low, as several potential targets are included in 
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the portfolio either too early or too late (hypothesis 3). To directly test the effect of 
anticipation by other market participants using similar models, we also hypothesise that 
takeover targets which are correctly predicted by our model are less of a surprise to the 
market, and, hence, earn significantly lower abnormal returns than targets which we are 
unable to predict (hypothesis 4).  
Third, we explore whether target characteristics that match those of firms that are 
predisposed to experience financial distress explain the difficulty of generating abnormal 
stock returns from target prediction models. Prior research (e.g., Pastena and Ruland, 1986; 
Clark and Ofek, 2004; Powell and Yawson, 2007) suggests that targets and bankrupt firms 
share similar characteristics, and, therefore, mergers and bankruptcy are alternative forms of 
reorganisation facing firms in distress. Targets and distressed (bankrupt) firms tend to be 
small firms with poor stock performance (Powell and Yawson, 2007). Takeover prediction 
models are therefore likely to select as potential targets firms that are simultaneously 
classified as candidates for bankruptcy. Prior takeover prediction studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986; 
Powell, 2001; Brar et al., 2009) ignore the impact of this tendency and hence overstate 
portfolio returns by not recognising the significant loss occurring when predicted targets exit 
the portfolio through bankruptcy.  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to consider the impact of bankruptcies on the 
profitability of investing in predicted takeover targets and to propose a strategy for mitigating 
its effect. We can directly address the issue of investing in firms that eventually go bankrupt 
by explicitly trying to identify these firms ex ante and excluding them from our target 
portfolio. We adopt an existing bankruptcy prediction model – the Taffler Z score model 
(Taffler, 1983) – to help us identify and eliminate potential candidates for bankruptcy prior to 
portfolio formation. The empirical evidence suggests bankruptcy prediction models identify 
firms in distress with a considerable level of error (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008) and hence, 
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should be used with some caution. Still, we hypothesise that stock returns are stronger when 
firms with low Taffler Z scores are excluded from target portfolios (hypothesis 5).   
 Our second solution to the distress problem builds on research findings that merging 
firms are larger and less leveraged than their counterparts which reorganise through 
bankruptcies (Pastena and Ruland, 1986). By using market capitalisation as a noisy (yet 
efficient) proxy to identify candidates for bankruptcy, we can mitigate its effect on our 
portfolio returns by reducing our net investment in firms that might potentially go bankrupt. 
We hypothesise that stock returns are stronger when excluding small capitalisation firms that 
are more likely to become insolvent (hypothesis 6). We can explore this by screening our 
portfolios for small firms.  
Nonetheless, prior research also suggests that the largest firms tend to be shielded 
from acquisition (Palepu, 1986). This implies that if the size cut-off in our screen is set so as 
to invest only in very large companies, we might avoid investing in most firms that 
eventually go bankrupt, but we will also be unlikely to invest in many firms that eventually 
receive takeover bids. We test this empirically by hypothesising that stock returns are weaker 
when investing only in large capitalisation firms that are less likely to become targets 
(hypothesis 7). Jointly, hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that there is a benefit (avoid firms that go 
bankrupt) and a drawback (less likely to invest in takeover targets) to investing in larger firms 
only. This would suggest that the traditional value-weighting strategy for portfolio formation 
might not address this problem, as it gives less weight to small firms, which may be more 
likely to suffer financial distress, but more weight to firms which are unlikely to be actual 
targets (hypothesis 8).  
Alternatively, we explore whether other bankruptcy indicators, including measures of 
the degree of firm leverage and firm liquidity, can be more effective in screening target 
portfolios for firms in financial distress. Prior research (e.g., Taffler, 1983; Pastena and 
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Ruland, 1986; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Powell and Yawson, 2007) suggests that bankrupt 
firms are characterised by low liquidity and high leverage. Hence, we hypothesise that stock 
returns are stronger when firms with high leverage and/or low liquidity are excluded from 
target portfolios (hypothesis 9). Ultimately, hypotheses 6 and 9 can be combined to explore 
whether target portfolio stock returns can be improved by screening for size, leverage and 
liquidity. 
We employ UK data between 1988 and 2011 to test our developed hypotheses. We 
find that a conventional target prediction model generates positive but marginal risk-adjusted 
returns of up to 0.4 percent per month (using the Capital Asset Pricing Model; CAPM), 
which is generally insignificant. This result is partly attributed to the model’s 
misclassification of several non-targets as targets (type II errors), as we find that target 
portfolios without type II errors generate substantial abnormal stock returns of up to 1.5 
percent per month (CAPM), significant at the one percent level. While substantial, the annual 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) to these target-only portfolios are still well below the 
19.5-31 percent BHAR or cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to M&A targets reported in 
prior studies (Georgen and Renneboog, 2004; Danbolt, 2004; Gregory and O’Donohoe, 
2014). This finding accentuates the significance of accurate timing in the prediction of 
potential targets. If the model selects targets too early, investors would achieve significant 
losses prior to the target price run-ups, as targets tend to underperform in the months leading 
up to a bid. If, on the contrary, the model predicts targets too late, the potential gains to 
investors are significantly reduced. We argue that accurate timing to minimise the effect of 
pre-bid underperformance while outsmarting other market participants remains a major 
challenge to the strategy. We explore whether this timing problem could be mitigated by the 
use of qualitative information, such as merger rumours. While our documented rumours are 
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useful in improving timing (as several bids are preceded by rumours), the adoption of a 
rumour screening strategy does not allow us to generate significant abnormal returns.  
Our study further highlights the tendency for target prediction models to identify a 
disproportionately high number of bankrupt firms as potential targets, leading to a significant 
reduction in stock returns. We explore different strategies for identifying and/or reducing the 
number of bankrupt firms within our target portfolios, including the use of Taffler Z scores 
and the use of size, liquidity and leverage screens. We find that the screening strategy 
substantially improves returns to target portfolios. For example, our target portfolio risk-
adjusted returns (CAPM) increases from 0.4 percent per month (insignificant) to 0.7 percent 
(significant at the five percent level) when we exclude all predicted targets with high leverage 
(in the top two quintiles). A combination strategy which screens target portfolio by size, 
liquidity and leverage (i.e., eliminates predicted targets in the bottom two size quintiles or the 
bottom two liquidity quintiles or the top two leverage quintiles) generates significant risk-
adjusted returns (CAPM) of 0.9 percent per month.   
The rest of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
We start by identifying a sample of all firms that are or have been listed on the main 
market of the London Stock Exchange between July 1988 and June 2011.1 Financial firms 
(SIC code 6000–6999) are excluded from the analysis as they are known to follow unique 
reporting standards, which makes the interpretation of their financial ratios different from 
those of other firms (e.g., Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2007). The final sample consists of 
                                                 
1 We use the RI datatype, which includes dividend payments only after 1988, to estimate stock returns. We include both 
live and dead firms to avoid survivorship bias. 
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2,970 firms. We obtain firm accounting data and stock returns from DataStream, and merger 
characteristics from Thomson OneBanker. The two databases are matched using firm 
DataStream codes.  
We focus on takeover bids, even if they eventually fail. Consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Cornett et al., 2011; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992), we restrict our sample of targets 
to those that receive bids which, if completed, would result in the bidder gaining control 
(greater than 50 percent shareholding) of the target. We obtain data for 2,799 M&A 
announcements involving publicly listed UK targets between 1st June 1989 and 30th June 
2011. This list excludes bids for minority interest, rumours or intentions, and announcements 
involving targets in the financial industry. We further exclude subsequent bids for the same 
target firm at different points within the same year. This generates a sample of 1,635 unique 
targets. In untabulated results, we find that out of an average of 1,471 listed firms per year, 74 
firms (5.05 percent of listed firms) receive a bid in any one year on average. This level of 
takeover activity is similar to the 5.00 percent (between 1986 and 1995) reported by Powell 
(2004), and varies from one year to another, with a high of 9.80 percent in 1997 and a low of 
2.55 percent in 1993.  
We use time-varying firm, industry and market characteristics to predict potential 
takeover targets. In line with Palepu (1986), we first adopt the following five hypotheses for 
the prediction of takeover targets: inefficient management, firm undervaluation 
(misevaluation), industry disturbance, growth-resource mismatch and firm size hypotheses. 
Consistent with Powell (1997) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992), we also incorporate two 
additional hypotheses for takeover prediction: the free cash flow and the tangible assets 
hypotheses. Following Pakes and Ericson (1998) and Agarwal and Gort (2002), we add firm 
age as a determinant of firm takeover likelihood. These eight hypotheses, variants of which 
have been widely used across the literature (see, for example, Ambrose and Megginson, 
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1992; Barnes 1998, 1999, 2000; Powell, 1997, 2001, 2004; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003), 
are used to develop a ‘conventional’ model. Further details on these hypotheses are provided 
below. 
The inefficient management hypothesis stipulates that takeovers play a disciplinary 
role through which an underperforming management team is replaced through a takeover. We 
use two proxies, the return on capital employed (ROCE) and average monthly excess returns 
(AER), to capture management performance. Following Palepu (1986) and Powell and 
Yawson (2007), AER is computed as a firm’s average monthly excess return over the market 
(FTSE All Share) return for the year to June.  
The misvaluation hypothesis suggests that the stock market’s inefficiency in the 
valuation of firms has important effects on takeover activity. The effects arise from the 
bidders’ deliberate efforts to ‘profit by buying undervalued targets for cash at a price below 
fundamental value, or by paying equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are less 
overvalued than the bidder’ (Dong et al., 2006, p. 726). Following Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) and Bi and Gregory (2011), in absolute terms (i.e., with no knowledge of the 
characteristics of the bidder), we would expect targets of cash acquisitions to be undervalued, 
and targets in stock-financed acquisitions to have higher valuation on average, and possibly 
even be overvalued.2 We use Tobin’s Q (market value to replacement cost of assets) to proxy 
for the level of target misvaluation. Consistent with Hasbrouck (1985) and Dong et al. 
(2006), Tobin’s Q is estimated as the sum of the book value of debt (i.e., the difference 
between the book value of assets and the book value of equity) and the market value of 
equity, scaled by the book value of assets. 
The industry disturbance hypothesis suggests that a firm’s takeover likelihood will 
increase with the announcement of a merger bid in that industry. Consistent with Palepu 
                                                 
2 We confirm this in additional analyses later in our study. 
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(1986), Walter (1994) and Lin et al. (2014), we use the industry disturbance dummy variable 
(IDDummy) to capture industry disturbances. IDDummy takes a value of one if any merger is 
completed within a firm’s industry in the year prior to the bid in question, and a value of zero 
otherwise. We define industries using the UK four-digit SIC code classification system. 
The growth-resource mismatch hypothesis suggests that low-growth but resource-rich 
firms, as well as high-growth but resource-poor firms, are more likely to become takeover 
targets. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986), we use four variables, including 
sales growth (SGrowth), firm liquidity (cash to total assets ratio), leverage (debt to equity 
ratio) and a growth-resource imbalance dummy variable (GRDummy), as proxies. An 
imbalance between growth opportunities and resources is said to occur when (1) a firm has 
high sales growth accompanied by low liquidity and high leverage, or when (2) a firm has 
low sales growth accompanied by high liquidity and low leverage. These variables are 
characterised as ‘low’ or ‘high’ by comparing them with the four-digit SIC code industry-
year average. The GRDummy takes a value of one in these two cases ((1) and (2) above) and 
a value of zero in all other combinations of growth, liquidity and leverage.  
The firm size hypothesis argues that takeover probability decreases with firm size, as 
the number of viable bidders for a target decreases as its size increases (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 
2001; Gorton et al., 2009). Consistent with Powell (1997), Powell and Yawson (2007), 
Cornett et al. (2011) and De and Jindra (2012), firm size is proxied by the natural log of total 
assets. 
The free cash flow hypothesis stipulates that takeover likelihood increases with a 
firm’s level of free cash flow. In an active market for corporate control, management which 
hoards or misappropriates excess free cash flow is likely to face a challenge for corporate 
control (Manne, 1965; Jensen, 1986; Powell, 1997). Besides the opportunity to correct 
management inefficiency, the bidding firm is further attracted by the excess free cash flow in 
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the target firm, as this free cash flow can be used to reduce the net cost of acquisition. 
Consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007), free cash flow (FCF) is defined as the ratio of 
net cash flow from operating activities less capital expenditures scaled by total assets.   
The real property hypothesis predicts that firms with substantial tangible fixed assets 
(such as plant and machinery) in their total asset portfolio are more attractive targets to 
bidders (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). Tangible fixed assets proxy for debt capacity and 
provide financial slack to enable a firm to raise debt capital in times of need (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). These assets can 
reduce a bidder’s implicit takeover cost, as they can be divested to raise the funds needed to 
complete the transaction. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Powell, 1997; Ambrose and 
Megginson, 1992), the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets is used as a 
measure for tangible assets.  
The firm age hypothesis suggests that takeover probability decreases with firm age 
(Brar et al., 2009; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009; Loderer and Waelchli, 2015). Firm survival 
(age) is frequently attributed to a firm’s endowments and its tendency to learn-by-doing over 
time (Pakes and Ericson, 1998; Agarwal and Gort, 2002; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009). Agarwal 
and Gort (2002) contend that, over time, a firm gains knowledge about itself and its industry, 
which allows it to achieve cost reductions and product improvements, and develop new 
market techniques. Firm endowments are generally low when firms are born, but increase 
over time as firms invest in research and development (Agarwal and Gort, 2002). Hence, the 
probability of firm survival (takeover) within an industry increases (decreases) as firms grow 
older. Firm age is proxied by the number of years since incorporation.  
 A summary of our hypotheses and the component variables is shown in Appendix 1. 
We eliminate outliers from our dataset by winsorising ROCE, AER, Tobin’s Q, sales growth, 
liquidity, leverage, free cash flow and tangible assets at the 1st and 99th percentiles. No 
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adjustments are made to the industry disturbance or growth-resource mismatch dummies, 
firm size and firm age.3 Note that to mitigate any look-ahead bias, we impose a time lag in 
our model which maintains that a firm’s takeover probability in the next period (t+1) is a 
function of its publicly available financial information in the most recent period (t). We 
follow the June approach (Soares and Stark, 2009) by developing the model on June 30th of 
each year (using accounting data up to the financial year-end of 31st December of the 
previous year), to predict and invest in targets from July 1st. The computation of ratios which 
utilise market data matches, for example, June 30th (2010) market data with accounting 
statement data for the previous financial year-end (2009). Our final dataset is made up of 
32,363 firm-year observations over a 22-year period (1988-2009).   
We model takeover likelihood in the spirit of Palepu (1986), Powell (2001), Cremers 
et al. (2009) and Lin et al. (2014). Our base regression model is the logit model given as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 11+𝑒−𝑍𝑖𝑖−1            (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑖 is the probability that firm i will be acquired in the current period (t) and 𝑍𝑖𝑖−1 is a 
vector of firm i’s characteristics in the previous period (t-1), given as follows: 
𝑍𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑖−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖−1,   (2) 
𝛽0 is the intercept term and 𝛽𝑗  (j = 1,…, k) represents the coefficients associated with the 
corresponding independent variables 𝑋𝑗 (j = 1,…, k) for each firm. The dependent variable 
𝑃𝑖𝑖  in our model takes the value of one if a firm (i) is the subject of a takeover in a period (t), 
and a value of zero otherwise.  
 
                                                 
3 In untabulated results, we follow alternative outlier treatments, and results remain qualitatively similar. 
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3.  Empirical results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics and model development 
We start by developing our prediction model using our panel dataset. Table 1 reports 
the differences in the characteristics of targets and non-targets within a univariate framework. 
We find that targets have higher operating performance (ROCE), but experience lower excess 
stock returns (AER) than non-targets in the year prior to a merger announcement. These 
results are consistent with Agarwal and Jaffe’s (2003) finding that US targets do not 
underperform in terms of operating performance, but do not support their argument that the 
targets do not also underperform in terms of stock market performance. The targets in our 
sample have a lower Tobin’s Q, lower liquidity and higher leverage in relation to counterpart 
non-targets. We further find that targets have higher levels of tangible assets and free cash 
flow, and are younger compared to non-targets. The higher free cash flow of targets is, 
perhaps, due to their higher levels of profitability. The results on firm size (i.e., targets are 
larger than non-targets) are particularly puzzling, as some studies (including Barnes, 1999 
and Powell, 2001) hypothesise a negative relation between firm size and takeover likelihood. 
In untabulated results, we find that the purported negative relation is only robust when we 
exclude small firms from our sample. The results are consistent with Powell and Yawson 
(2007), who find that UK targets have significantly lower liquidity, higher leverage, lower 
stock returns and larger size compared to non-targets. Our findings are robust to different 
outlier management procedures and consistent with the management inefficiency, 
misevaluation (undervaluation argument), tangible property, free cash flow and firm age 
hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
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We use a multivariate framework to explore the relation between the above firm 
characteristics and firm takeover likelihood by estimating binomial logistic regressions. We 
first estimate Pearson and Spearman correlations and the variance inflation factors. These 
results are available upon request. We find that the level of correlation among our variables is 
modest and unlikely to lead to multicollinearity concerns. Table 2 reports the parameter 
coefficients of the logistic regressions, where the dependent variable is the takeover 
likelihood. We present results for logit estimations with clustering of standard errors by firm 
and year.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
We find empirical support for the inefficient management (average excess return), 
undervaluation (Tobin’s Q), tangible assets, free cash flow and firm age hypotheses, but no 
support for the growth resource mismatch, industry disturbance or firm size hypotheses. The 
coefficients of the growth-resource mismatch and industry disturbance dummies are not 
significant, but we find that takeover likelihood declines with firm liquidity. Our main results 
are consistent with those reported in prior UK studies, such as Powell and Yawson (2007), 
who for UK firms between 1992 and 2001 find that takeover likelihood decreases with 
average abnormal returns and increases with firm size.  
3.2 Model predictive ability 
As in prior studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Bartley and Boardman, 1990; Barnes, 1999, 
2000; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003; Powell, 2001; Pasiouras et al., 2007), we employ an 
out-of-sample period to also evaluate the predictive ability of the model. Firms are ranked by 
their predicted takeover probability, and the 20 percent of firms with the highest takeover 
probability (Quintile 5 or Q5) is selected as our target portfolio.4 Following Cremers et al. 
                                                 
4 In untabulated results, we use alternative size portfolios, such as decile portfolios, to determine potential targets, and 
conclusions remain qualitatively similar.  
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(2009), we adopt a recursive model evaluation technique, where the model is recurrently 
redeveloped using new data and is tested over several holdout periods between 1995 and 
2009. The target concentration ratio, a measure of model performance, is the proportion of 
True Positives within the target portfolios. 
As shown in Figure 1, we find that the target concentration ratio achieved by the 
model (in the top quintile) varies throughout the sample period and is, on average, equal to 
8.52 percent. The model correctly predicts a total of 302 targets, out of 3,545 predictions over 
the fifteen-year period. Note that the model outperforms prior UK models5 as well as a 
random selection approach to target prediction. Recall that in any one year, on average 5.05 
percent of our population were targets, and therefore the model’s predictive ability 
outperforms a random selection of potential targets. The average difference in target 
concentration ratio across the fifteen-year holdout period is significant at the one percent 
level (p-value of 0.000).  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
3.3 Abnormal returns earned by the target prediction model 
Next, we estimate the abnormal stock returns generated by the prediction model using 
monthly stock returns, as advocated by Gilbert et al. (2014). Given the general scepticism 
about the UK’s version of the Carhart (1997) model (see Gregory et al., 2013), we adjust our 
target portfolio returns for risk using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe 
(1964) and the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model (FF3F), and by also using control 
or benchmark portfolios.6 The data for the monthly risk-free rate (RF), the monthly market 
                                                 
5 We compare our results directly with those of prior UK studies, mainly Powell (2001, 2004). Sample restrictions do not 
allow for a direct comparison with Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell (1997). We adopt the same time period and 
portfolio selection approach used by Powell (2001, 2004) for developing and testing our model. Powell (2001) and 
Powell (2004) achieve an out-of-sample target concentration of 2.44 percent and 4.72 percent in 1996, respectively. Our 
model achieves a higher target concentration of 12.5 percent in the same period.  
6 Results for Carhart model estimations are not materially different. These results are available on request. 
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return (RM) and the risk factors, including size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML), are 
collected from Gregory et al. (2013). We compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
using market, size, market-to-book and combined size and book-to-market benchmark 
portfolios following the procedure in Barber and Lyon (1997). In each year, we calculate the 
buy-and-hold return (BHR) on each security in our sample using monthly returns in the year 
to June. All firms in each year constitute our market benchmark portfolio. To generate the 
size (or the book-to-market) benchmark portfolios, we first rank firms by their market value 
(or book-to-market value) on the 1st of July of each year. Next, we group them into ten 
deciles, with decile 10 constituting the ten percent of firms with the largest market (or book-
to-market) value in each year. Finally, we combine our ten size and ten book-to-market 
deciles to create 100 portfolios (combinations) ranked by both size and book-to-market 
values. As in Barber and Lyon (1997), a firm’s BHAR is the difference between its BHR and 
the BHR of its corresponding size, book-to-market and combined size and book-to-market 
benchmark portfolio. The BHAR of the predicted target portfolio is obtained by averaging the 
BHARs of its constituent firms in each period. Following Lyon et al. (1999), we compute 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics and p-values for portfolios’ BHARs by drawing 
1,000 bootstrapped resamples, each of a size equal to a quarter of our portfolio size (i.e.,  
n/4). Table 3 presents results for equal-weighted portfolio abnormal returns (CAPM and 
FF3F regression alphas and BHARs). 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
As in Model 1 of Table 3, we find that over the fifteen-year out-of-sample period, the 
prediction model generates CAPM risk-adjusted returns of 0.4 percent per month, which are 
not significant at the ten percent level (p-value of 0.191). The result obtained using the FF3F 
model is slightly lower (0.3 percent per month) but also significant at the ten percent level (p-
value of 0.099). Results obtained using the BHAR benchmarks are positive but, with the 
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exception of the market and book-to-market benchmarks, not significant at the ten percent 
level. 7 Overall, the results suggest that the risk-adjusted returns to the standard strategy of 
investing in predicted target portfolios are marginal (if any). The model’s risk-adjusted return 
for the period 1st July 1996 to 30th June 2011 is, however, higher than the -4 percent per year 
(January to December) reported by Powell (2001) for predicted UK targets in 1996. It is, 
nonetheless, lower than the 0.6 percent per month reported by Brar et al. (2009) for predicted 
EU targets between January 1995 and December 2003. Overall, the results suggest that, 
despite our ability to correctly predict some targets, generating risk-adjusted returns from the 
strategy is challenging. In the remainder of the study, we explore why generating abnormal 
returns from predicted target portfolios is a difficult pursuit, and we recommend 
implementable strategies for improving target portfolio returns.  
3.4 Portfolio timing and target portfolio returns 
3.4.1 Prediction errors partly explain portfolio underperformance 
We first explore whether prediction errors are responsible for the low returns to our 
target portfolio. If, in every year, we could accurately predict and invest in all the targets in 
the full sample, we would have generated CAPM-adjusted returns or a BHAR of about 1.20 
percent per month (p-value < 0.000) over the holding period (Table 3, Model 2). Indeed, we 
fail to include 76.69 percent of actual targets in our portfolio. In addition, the model predicts 
that some of the firms in the sample will receive a bid during a particular year, but in 91.48 
percent of instances (on average), no bid occurs (i.e., type II errors). However, we find that 
some of the type II errors eventually receive a takeover bid in a subsequent period.8 This 
suggests that portfolios might underperform because of the presence of type II errors and/or 
                                                 
7 In untabulated results, we estimate abnormal returns for different portfolio formation strategies, including deciles and 
optimal cut-off probabilities (see Powell, 2001). Our results remain qualitatively similar.  
8 Some examples include National Express, UK Coal and JJB Sport. UK Coal, for example, appears in our target 
portfolio in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2007 and 2008 but only receives a bid in 2008. 
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because of the time gap between the month/year of portfolio formation and the time of the 
actual bid. We first explore whether the type II errors within our portfolios exceptionally 
underperform or contribute to the poor returns to these portfolios. In empirical terms, we 
evaluate whether portfolios that fail to correctly predict any target significantly underperform. 
Conversely, as per hypothesis 2, we also investigate whether predicted target portfolios 
without type II errors generate positive abnormal stock returns.  
As shown in Model 4 of Table 3, we find that the portfolio of type II errors does not 
generate positive abnormal returns. When we exclude actual targets from our portfolios, the 
CAPM alphas to these portfolios decline from 0.4 percent (in Model 1) to 0 percent per 
month (in Model 4). Similar results are obtained when other risk adjustment models, 
including FF3F and benchmark portfolios, are employed. Inconsistent with prior suggestions 
that type II errors are exceptional underperformers (Powell, 2001; Cahan et al., 2011), the 
portfolio of type II errors (Model 4) does not underperform the non-targets in the portfolio of 
predicted non-targets (Model 7). The non-targets in the portfolio of predicted non-targets 
generate a much lower CAPM-adjusted return of -0.6 percent per month (p-value of 0.050) 
and a FF3F-adjusted return of -0.8 percent per month (p-value < 0.000). As predicted by 
hypothesis 2, when type II errors are excluded from our target portfolio (Model 3), the risk-
adjusted portfolio returns (CAPM) increase from 0.4 percent (p-value of 0.190) to 1.5 percent 
per month (p-value of 0.000). Overall, these results suggest that the targets which we 
correctly predict significantly contribute to improving the abnormal returns to our portfolios. 
Consistent with our first and second hypotheses, the evidence suggests that type II errors are 
principally responsible for the underperformance of our portfolios. In a later section, we 
revisit the issue of whether type II errors in the prediction model can be reduced. 
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3.4.2 Accurate timing is required to optimise returns to target portfolios 
Although the results in Model 3 of Table 3 show that the targets in our portfolio 
generate significant returns, the estimated annual BHAR of 14 percent (market benchmark) 
for this portfolio is substantially lower than the 19.5 to 31 percent abnormal returns to targets 
reported in prior studies (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Franks and Harris, 1989; Georgen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Danbolt, 2004; Gregory and O’Donohoe, 2014). As per our hypothesis 3, 
we explore whether this difference can be attributed to the timing of bid announcements 
versus our portfolio inception dates. Panel A of Figure 2 shows the distribution of merger 
bids throughout a year, and, as expected, there is no clear pattern. Following the June 
approach, we use a portfolio inception date of July 1st in each year, but only 8.7 percent of the 
bids in our sample are announced in July. There is thus a time gap between the month of the 
portfolio formation and the actual bid month in 91.3 percent of cases. Panel B of Figure 2 
estimates the cumulative abnormal monthly returns to all targets in the sample, starting from 
12 months before the bid (month -12) and ending 12 months after the bid (month 12). 
Consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis, we find that targets tend to perform 
poorly several months prior to receiving a bid. For example, the cumulative monthly stock 
returns from -11 months to -3 months are approximately -13 percent. Some of these negative 
returns are captured in the portfolios, given that researchers generally adopt a fixed portfolio 
holding period, such as the June approach. Consistent with our third hypothesis, this timing 
problem perhaps explains why a conventional annual rebalancing of portfolios generates 
lower than expected abnormal holding-period returns for actual targets.    
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
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3.4.3 Market anticipation reduces returns to predicted targets 
As the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests, the prediction model would generate 
abnormal returns only if we can predict targets before other market participants. If our 
predictions are shared by the market,9 we should expect to earn lower returns from them even 
when they come to fruition. Figure 3 shows the abnormal stock returns over the period from 
20 days (one trading month) before the merger announcement for firms with high takeover 
probability (predicted targets) that actually received a bid, and counterpart firms with low 
takeover probability (predicted non-targets) that received a bid. Predicted non-targets which 
receive a bid are likely to be a surprise to the market. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, 
we find that firms with high takeover probability (Quintile 5, Figure 3) experience higher pre-
bid target price run-ups and lower announcement returns (-1,1 days) in relation to their 
predicted non-target counterparts (Quintile 1, Figure 3). For example, the announcement 
effect for firms with low takeover probability is 22.50 percent versus 16.01 percent for high 
takeover probability counterparts. The difference is significant at the five percent level. 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, our results suggest that some of the actual 
targets that the model succeeds in predicting do not earn high abnormal returns, as might be 
expected from the M&A literature, perhaps due to parallel anticipation by other market 
participants. These results further emphasise the importance of timing, as the challenge is not 
only to correctly predict targets just a few months before takeover bids in order to avoid the 
pre-bid systematic target underperformance, but also to predict them ahead of other market 
participants. 
                                                 
9 The prediction model that we adopt in this study is in the public domain. Hence, we can reasonably expect that a 
similar model will be used by other market participants. 
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3.4.4 Can portfolio timing and returns be improved using rumour data? 
We now explore whether we can improve portfolio timing and reduce the effect of 
target pre-bid underperformance by using qualitative market signals, such as merger rumours. 
Given that rumours occur at specific dates, and prior studies (e.g., Jindra and Walking, 2004; 
Ahern and Sosyura, 2015; Chou et al., 2015) suggest that several takeovers are preceded by 
rumours, we explore whether information about the specific month in which a rumour occurs 
could be useful in improving the timing of portfolios. We collect data on merger rumours 
from Thomson OneBanker, where the rumoured targets are UK firms in our sample whose 
M&A deal status is described as “intended, rumour or seeking buyer”.10 For simplicity, we 
collectively describe these deals as “rumours” in subsequent discussions. We do not exclude 
cases in which the intent is eventually withdrawn, the rumour discontinued or the target 
withdraws its search for a buyer, as this could bias the analysis. However, the results do not 
change qualitatively when we exclude such cases. 
Out of 453 takeover rumour-related news items over our portfolio holding period (1st 
July 1996 to 30th June 2011), 115 items correspond to firms in our target portfolio (an 
average of 7.67 rumours per year) and 70 correspond to firms in our non-target portfolio (an 
average of 4.67 rumours per year). The difference is statistically significant at the one percent 
level, suggesting an association between merger rumours and takeover likelihood.  
We explore whether this set of rumours could be used to improve target portfolio 
returns. Focusing on rumours in our target portfolio, we plot (in Figure 4) the cumulative 
abnormal stock returns (1) around rumours, for all rumoured targets; (2) around rumours, for 
all rumoured targets that eventually receive a takeover bid; and (3) around merger bids, for all 
rumoured targets. That is, (2) and (3) plot the rumour returns and eventual bid announcement 
                                                 
10 An example of a rumour reported in Thomson OneBanker on 24th September 2009 is the following: “Microsoft Corp 
of the US was rumoured to be planning to launch a tender offer to acquire the entire share capital of Autonomy Corp 
PLC, a Cambridge-based developer of infrastructure software”.  
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returns, respectively, for bids which are preceded by merger rumours. Note that, as shown in 
the figure, most of the returns to rumoured targets (1) are earned on the day when the rumour 
emerges. Some of these rumoured targets eventually receive takeover bids (2). Importantly, 
the rumoured targets which eventually receive takeover bids (2) also earn significant 
abnormal returns when the merger bid is formally announced (3). This suggests that while we 
might not benefit from the initial rumour (as we are unlikely to be able to anticipate its 
emergence ex ante), we might earn returns once the rumour is followed by a formal takeover 
bid.  
[Insert Figure 4 around here] 
We use rumours to screen our target portfolio by investing in predicted targets only 
when they are associated with a rumour. To avoid look-ahead bias, we compute risk-adjusted 
returns to the rumoured target portfolio, starting from the month following the month in 
which the rumour emerges. As shown in Table 3 (Model 9), we find that the rumoured target 
portfolio generates risk-adjusted returns which are insignificant. 11  Overall, these results 
suggest that, while there is a significant association between merger rumours and the 
emergence of takeover bids, such merger rumours (at least those in OneBanker) are unlikely 
to be useful when attempting to generate returns from the takeover prediction modelling. One 
reason for this is, perhaps, the limited number of rumours in our sample; there are several 
months/periods in which we do not invest in predicted targets as no rumours emerge. Overall, 
we do not find a viable solution to the timing problem. 
                                                 
11 If we are able to capture the rumour returns as in Model 8, i.e., we invest in rumours before they emerge, the strategy 
yields a positive but statistically insignificant return. This is clearly not implementable. 
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3.5 Distressed firms and target portfolio returns 
3.5.1 Distressed firms are misclassified as potential targets  
Evidence suggests that target and distressed (or bankrupt) firms share common firm 
characteristics (Powell and Yawson, 2007), which may explain the difficulty of generating 
abnormal returns from target portfolios. Consistent with this evidence, as shown in Figure 1, 
target prediction models are likely to classify a disproportionately high number of financially 
distressed (or bankrupt) firms as potential targets. In this study, we identify bankrupt UK 
firms using the LSPD’s Master Index File. Firms with the following ‘Type of Death’ 
identifications are considered bankrupt: liquidation, delisted and all dealings terminated, 
receiver appointed, administrative receivership, and cancelled or suspended. In our analyses 
of portfolio returns, a -100 percent return in the firm delisting month has been assumed and 
was inserted to adjust for bankruptcy cost to investors.  
Consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007), the results show that target portfolios 
have a disproportionately higher number of bankrupt firms. Indeed, 43.75 percent (and 13.54 
percent) of the bankrupt firms in the sample are included in the quintile of firms with the 
highest (and lowest) takeover likelihood. This complements Pastena and Ruland’s (1986) and 
Clark and Ofek’s (1994) argument that mergers and bankruptcies are alternative forms of 
reorganisation for firms in distress. To investigate the impact of bankrupt firms on abnormal 
stock returns, we exclude bankrupt firms from the target portfolios and compute the abnormal 
target returns to these portfolios. As shown in Table 4 (Model 1), we find that the returns to 
target portfolios generally improve significantly when bankrupt firms are excluded. The 
CAPM-adjusted portfolio returns become 0.6 percent per month, and are now significant at 
the five percent level. The monthly risk-adjusted returns generated using the FF3F model and 
benchmark portfolios are similarly about 0.2 percentage points higher. Nonetheless, for this 
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to be implementable, one must be able to successfully identify and exclude bankrupt firms 
from target portfolios ex ante.  
3.5.2 The impact of distressed firms can be limited by imposing a ‘Z score’, ‘size’, 
‘leverage’ or ‘liquidity’ screen 
We explore two main options for identifying bankrupt firms ex ante and mitigating 
their effects on portfolio returns. The first is to employ an existing bankruptcy prediction 
model to identify and exclude firms that have a high probability of going bankrupt, and the 
second is to use simple proxies for bankruptcy risk (firm market capitalisation, liquidity 
and/or leverage) to screen our portfolios for firms with high bankruptcy risk. Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008) suggest that the Taffler Z score model is still efficient in identifying firms in 
financial distress. We use model parameters from Taffler (1983) to estimate Taffler Z scores 
for all firms in our sample in every year between 1995 and 2009. In the next stage, we rank 
all firms in our sample by Z score and, from our target portfolio, we successively exclude all 
firms with Z scores in the bottom (Model 2) and bottom two Z score quintiles (Model 3).12 
This allows us to invest only in predicted targets with corresponding high Z scores. The risk-
adjusted returns to target portfolios improve as we sequentially eliminate the first and then 
first and second quintiles of firms with low Z scores (Table 4, Models 2 and 3). The results 
do not improve further when more quintiles (i.e., third and fourth quintiles) are excluded. 
In the second instance, we use firm market capitalisation as a proxy for financial 
distress, as research suggests that firms with higher market capitalisation are less likely to 
reorganise through bankruptcy (Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Clark and Ofek, 1994). We 
consider a simple size screening strategy, where we invest equally in all predicted targets 
                                                 
12 In untabulated results, we also apply the zero Z score threshold suggested by Taffler (1983) to identify and exclude 
firms in financial distress from the target portfolio. This allows us to only eliminate 27.0 percent of bankrupt firms in the 
predicted target portfolio, and our target portfolio monthly FF3F–adjusted return falls from 0.3 percent (Table 3, Model 
2) to 0.2 percent (and is no longer statistically significant). 
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with a market value above a certain threshold. In untabulated results, when we impose a size 
threshold of £50 million (comparable to the $100 million imposed by Brar et al. (2009)), we 
are able to exclude 99.3 percent of bankrupt firms in our target portfolio, but we also exclude 
33 percent of actual targets in this portfolio. Consistent with hypothesis 6, this significant 
reduction in the number of bankrupt firms allows us to generate significant CAPM-adjusted 
returns of 0.6 percent per month (p-value of 0.071). Consistent with hypothesis 7, the returns 
to target portfolios fall when substantially higher thresholds are imposed. For example, when 
a market value threshold of £500 million is imposed, the portfolio alpha (CAPM) is equal to 
0.2 percent (p-value of 0.972). In untabulated results, we also find that other thresholds 
between £50 million and £500 million do not lead to substantial improvements in 
performance. Given that the £50 million threshold eliminates 99.3 percent of the bankrupt 
firms, this finding supports our contention that the improvement in portfolio returns when 
size screening is employed is largely explained by its exclusion of bankrupt firms.  
To complement the use of size thresholds (for consistency), we rank all firms in our 
sample by market capitalisation, and successively exclude firms in the bottom size quintiles 
from our target portfolios. The returns to these target portfolios are reported in Table 4 
(Models 5 and 6). Consistent with hypothesis 6, the results show that the elimination of 
predicted targets in the bottom two size quintiles leads to a slight improvement in portfolio 
returns (e.g., from CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.4 to 0.5 percent per month).13 
Our eighth hypothesis is that traditional value-weighting strategies might not address 
the issue of bankruptcy of firms in our target portfolio. As in Table 4 (Model 4), consistent 
with this hypothesis, a value-weighting strategy does not yield significant positive portfolio 
returns. While such a strategy gives less weight to firms which are more likely to go bankrupt 
(i.e., small firms), it also gives more weight to large firms which are less likely to receive 
                                                 
13 Additionally, the imposition of a higher size threshold (i.e., the elimination of Q1 and Q2 as opposed to just Q1) leads 
to significant FF3F, market BHAR and BTM BHAR, as shown in Model 6 of Table 4. 
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takeover bids. The net effect is that the strategy does not improve the returns from target 
prediction.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Following our ninth hypothesis, we use firm leverage and liquidity to screen target 
portfolios for firms in financial distress by successively eliminating all firms in the top 
leverage and bottom liquidity quintiles before computing the portfolio risk-adjusted returns. 
Results from Models 7 and 8 of Table 4 show that portfolio returns continuously improve as 
we eliminate highly leveraged firms. When we eliminate the top two leverage quintiles, our 
portfolios report FF3F- and CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.7 percent per month, as well as 
BHARs of 0.4 percent per month, significant at the five percent level (Model 8). Similarly, 
the returns to our target portfolios improve as we eliminate stocks with low liquidity. For 
example, we achieve target portfolio CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.6 percent (p-value of 
0.053) when we exclude all firms in the bottom two liquidity quintiles (Model 10). As before, 
the results do not further improve when the third and fourth quintiles are also excluded. 
Ultimately, as in Model 11, we find that we can generate substantial risk-adjusted returns 
when we screen our target portfolios using all three criteria (size, liquidity and leverage). The 
portfolios achieve CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.9 percent per month (p-value of 0.021), FF3F-
adjusted returns of 0.8 per month (p-value of 0.007) and BHARs of between 0.7 and 0.9 
percent per month (significant at the one percent level). These results provide evidence to 
support the use of our portfolio screening strategy. Overall, these results suggest that takeover 
prediction as an investment strategy is potentially profitable when steps can be taken to 
mitigate the effects of financially distressed firms within target portfolios.  
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3.6 Additional analyses 
In this section, we perform four additional analyses to explore whether we can even 
further improve our results. In the first analysis, we consider whether an extended prediction 
model (i.e., one with more predictive variables) yields better results by reducing type II errors 
in prediction. In the second, we test whether we can improve model predictive ability, and 
hence portfolio returns, by using industry-adjusted firm ratios. In the third, we explore 
whether a multinomial model which predicts targets by method of payment potentially 
generates higher portfolio abnormal returns. In the final analysis, we investigate whether a 
hedge strategy (involving the short-selling of distressed firms) can be used to further improve 
the returns to our portfolios. We discuss these below. 
The findings from Table 3 suggest that prediction errors were partly responsible for 
the poor performance of target portfolios generated from conventional prediction models. In 
the first analysis, we explore whether the predictive ability of the conventional prediction 
model can be improved by incorporating variables that have been shown in recent studies to 
explain takeover likelihood. Following recent M&A studies, we augment the conventional 
model by further adding industry concentration (Powell and Yawson, 2007), a block holders 
dummy (Cremers et al., 2009), price momentum, trading volume, a market sentiment dummy 
(Brar et al., 2009), and a rumour dummy (Siganos and Papa, 2015) as variables that can 
potentially explain a firm’s takeover likelihood. We eliminate outliers by winsorising price 
momentum at the 1st and 99th percentiles, but no adjustments are made to the other variables. 
The hypotheses and their proxies are summarised in Appendix 2. We use these new variables 
to develop an expanded (augmented) model, which we use to generate new predicted target 
portfolios.14  
                                                 
14 The model parameters for the full sample period are available upon request. 
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The conventional and augmented models identify similar firms as potential targets, 
with 77.64 percent of firms predicted as targets by the conventional model also predicted as 
targets by the augmented model. Nonetheless, the augmented model predicts 3,526 targets 
over fifteen years, of which only 280 become actual targets – a target concentration of 7.94 
percent, compared to the 8.52 percent achieved by the conventional model. This suggests that 
we do not improve the conventional model’s predictive ability by adding the new variables 
suggested in recent studies.  
Next, we explore whether portfolios generated from the augmented model earn risk-
adjusted returns before and after our suggested strategies are applied. The results are reported 
in Table 5. We find that the CAPM abnormal return to the portfolio of predicted targets 
generated by the augmented model is 0.2 percent per month, but insignificant, with a p-value 
of 0.567. The BHARs across all benchmarks are not significantly different from zero. We 
replicate our strategies of sequentially eliminating firms with low Z scores, low market 
values, high leverage and low liquidity. As shown in Table 5, the augmented model generates 
lower risk-adjusted returns across all strategies than the conventional model (Table 4). When 
portfolios are screened by size, liquidity and leverage, it also generates substantial but 
slightly lower risk-adjusted returns across all models. Overall, these results show that the 
conventional model performs well and is not substantially improved by including new 
predictive variables (such as those in Appendix 2). We therefore do not have a clear answer 
as to how to improve the prediction model so as to reduce the number of type II errors.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
In the second test, we explore whether the predictive ability of the conventional model 
can be improved by scaling the accounting variables by their industry averages to derive 
industry-adjusted accounting variables. As noted in Powell (2001), the use of industry-
relative ratios can improve data stability in long-run prediction studies. Further, firms that 
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‘stand-out’ from their counterparts in the industry (e.g., by performing comparatively poorly) 
are perhaps more likely to be targeted for takeover. We find that the predictive ability of the 
model declines slightly when all firm variables (except dummy variables) are scaled by their 
industry averages. The industry-adjusted model achieves a slightly lower target concentration 
of 8.24 percent compared to the 8.52 percent achieved by the conventional model. As shown 
in Table 6, this lower predictive ability leads to lower returns to target portfolios (Model 1). 
The returns remain low and insignificant (e.g., CAPM-adjusted returns of 0.3 percent per 
month, p-value of 0.339) even after screening portfolios for size, liquidity and leverage 
(Model 2). The decline in CAPM-adjusted abnormal returns from 0.9 percent per month 
(Table 4, Model 11) is, perhaps, too great to be simply explained by the slight decline in 
target concentration. Upon further analysis, we find that only 50.63 percent of firms predicted 
as targets by the conventional model are also predicted as targets by the industry-adjusted 
conventional model. This suggests that the industry-adjusted model predicts a new set of 
targets, perhaps those which ‘stand-out’ from their counterparts but do not perform as well. 
The result is that the portfolios generated by the industry-adjusted model earn abnormal 
returns which are not statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Prior studies have shown that the returns to targets vary by method of payment, with 
targets of cash bids typically earning significantly higher announcement returns (Danbolt, 
2004). In the third analysis, we test whether we can generate higher abnormal returns from 
takeover prediction by focusing on potential targets of cash bids. To explore this, we identify 
the method of payment (stock, cash and mixed) for each of the bids in our sample. This 
allows us to use existing variables from our conventional model to develop a multinomial 
model which predicts whether a firm will receive a cash bid, stock bid, mixed pay bid or no 
bid. In this model, 𝑃𝑖𝑖 (from equation 1) takes a value of zero if no takeover is announced in a 
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period (t); one if a firm (i) is the subject of a takeover where the bidder offers cash as the 
method of payment; two when the bidder offers stock; and three when the bidder offers a mix 
of cash and stock in exchange for the target’s shares. With the exception of valuation and 
size, we do not find substantial variability in the financial characteristics of targets of ‘cash’, 
‘stock’ and ‘mixed’ methods of payment bids as proxied by our hypotheses. 15 The results 
from our multinomial model suggest that targets in cash acquisitions are typically 
undervalued (low Tobin’s Q), while targets in stock acquisitions typically have higher 
Tobin’s Q ratios. These results are consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Bi and 
Gregory (2011). They also support Dong et al.’s (2006) contention that takeovers are driven 
by bidders who deliberately seek to profit from investor misvaluation by buying undervalued 
targets for cash or by paying equity for overvalued targets. Consistent with our transaction 
cost argument (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; Gorton et al., 2009), we also find some evidence 
suggesting that bidders are likely to offer cash to purchase small targets but are likely to offer 
stock when bidding for larger targets.  
We follow our recursive approach to generate new parameters for this model, 
predicting targets by method of payment, one year ahead, for the period 1995-2009. Using 
‘non-target’ as our base category in the multinomial regression, we generate probabilities that 
each firm-year observation in the holdout period will be a ‘cash’, ‘stock’ or ‘mixed pay’ 
target. We then use our ‘cash’ takeover probability to rank firms and generate our quintile 
target portfolios as before. The multinomial model predicting ‘cash targets’ makes 3,542 
predictions over the holdout period (1995-2009), of which 281 (7.93 percent) turn out to be 
actual targets. The 281 actual targets consist of 215 (6.07 percent) ‘cash’ targets, 43 (1.21 
percent) ‘stock’ targets and 23 (0.65 percent) ‘mixed pay’ targets. Besides misclassifying 
non-targets as potential ‘cash’ targets, the model also misclassifies ‘stock’ targets and ‘mixed 
                                                 
15 The parameters of this model for the full sample period are available upon request. 
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pay’ targets as potential ‘cash’ targets. The ‘cash’ target concentration (6.07 percent), as well 
as the overall target concentration (7.93 percent), achieved by the multinomial model is lower 
than the concentration achieved by the conventional model (8.52 percent). As expected, this 
(slightly) lower predictive ability also translates into (slightly) lower portfolio abnormal 
returns, as shown in Table 6 (Models 3 and 4). The abnormal returns from this model are 
about 0.1 percentage points lower than those from the conventional model. The results 
suggest that the multinomial model is not a substantial improvement on the conventional 
model. 
The results from Table 4 suggest that the returns to target portfolios generated using 
the conventional model can be improved by screening for size, liquidity and leverage – a 
process which reduces the proportion of distressed firms in predicted target portfolios. In our 
final test, we explore whether there are benefits to pursuing a hedge strategy which involves 
holding the portfolio of screened targets and also short-selling the distressed stocks. It is 
worth noting that such a strategy might be unimplementable due to the practical difficulty of 
short-selling some of these small and/or distressed stocks. The results from this analysis are 
presented in Table 6 (Model 5). We find, to the extent that this is implementable, the hedge 
strategy yields returns which are slightly higher than those generated by a simple screening 
strategy. The results from the CAPM and FF3F models are similar (0.9 percent per month), 
but the market benchmark BHAR from the hedge strategy increases to 1.4 percent per month. 
4.  Conclusion 
Several studies have investigated whether abnormal returns can be earned by 
investing in portfolios of predicted targets. Even without considering the negative impact of 
bankrupt firms within predicted target portfolios, the results from prior research suggest that 
the strategy is unlikely to yield consistent returns for investors. We contribute to this 
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literature by exploring the challenges of generating abnormal returns from target prediction 
modelling and identifying ways in which some of these challenges can be mitigated. Our 
initial results suggest that portfolio returns are contingent on our ability to correctly predict 
targets, as type II errors within our target portfolio reduce the returns to these portfolios. 
Nonetheless, by comparing the performance of an augmented and a conventional model, we 
find that the performance of the prediction model does not improve when we simply expand 
the number of predictive variables in models.  
We attribute some of the poor performance of target portfolios to seemingly 
unavoidable inefficiencies in the timing of predictions. The fact that targets typically 
underperform several months prior to bids, and the difficulty of accurately timing predictions 
(to minimise periods of pre-bid underperformance yet outsmart other market participants), 
appear to be drawbacks of the strategy. Our results show that qualitative information, such as 
merger rumours, could potentially be used to screen target portfolios and partly alleviate the 
timing problem. However, based on our limited dataset of merger rumours, we do not find 
evidence that target portfolios generate significant risk-adjusted returns when a rumour 
screen is applied. Nonetheless, this timing issue diminishes but does not eliminate the 
prospect of earning positive abnormal returns from the target prediction strategy.  
Our results also reveal that predicted target portfolios do not earn positive abnormal 
returns, due to the tendency for a disproportionate number of poorly-performing firms, some 
of which end up going bankrupt, to be misclassified as expected takeover targets. Given that 
bankrupt firms tend to be smaller, less liquid and highly leveraged, we show that a simple 
size, leverage or liquidity screening strategy can be used to mitigate much of the negative 
effect of bankrupt and distressed firms within target portfolios. We provide evidence that the 
adoption of this recommended strategy leads to the generation of significant positive 
abnormal returns of up to 0.9 percent per month. Similar or even slightly higher returns could 
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be achieved if one is able to further short-sell these high bankruptcy risk firms. Overall, the 
results of the study provide a foundation for the development of optimal portfolio strategies 
for academic and practitioner purposes.  
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Appendix 1 
Hypotheses, proxies and constituent DataStream variables 
Hypotheses Proxies (Exp. sign) DataStream codes/Data source 
Inefficient management ROCE (–)  wc01250, wc03998 
AER (–) RI (Firm and FTSE ALL Share index) 
Undervaluation Tobin’s Q (+) wc03501, wc02649, NOSH, UP 
Growth-resource  
mismatch 
SGrowth (+/–) wc01001 
Liquidity (+/–) wc02001, wc02999 
Leverage (+/–) wc03255, wc03995 
GRDummy (+) wc01001, wc02001, wc02999, wc03255, wc03995 
Industry disturbance IDDummy (+) SIC codes 
Firm size Firm size (–) wc02999 
Free cash flow FCF (+) wc04860, wc04601, wc02999 
Tangible assets Tangibility(+) wc02501, wc02999 
Firm age Firm age  (–) wc18273 
Notes:   
This table presents the constituent DataStream variables used to develop proxies for the hypotheses. The proxies for 
these hypotheses, together with their expected signs, are shown in the second column. ROCE is the ratio of EBITDA to 
total capital employed. AER (average excess returns) is computed as a firm’s average monthly excess return over the 
market (FTSE All Share) return for the year to June. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to book value of assets. 
SGrowth (sales growth) is the percentage of change in total revenue from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 
one when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources, and a value of zero otherwise. 
IDDummy (industry disturbance dummy) takes a value of one if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry, and a value of 
zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow 
minus capital investments) to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to 
total assets. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in parentheses. Data is 
obtained from Thomson DataStream and OneBanker databases.  
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Appendix 2 
Additional variables in the augmented model 
Hypothesis Rationale Proxy Reference 
Industry 
Concentration 
Competition in product 
markets (i.e., low 
industry concentration) 
is especially costly for 
inefficiently managed 
firms, as it leads to 
elimination, possibly 
through takeovers. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index; sum of the squared 
market shares (proxied by 
total revenues) of all listed 
firms in the industry. 
Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 
1997; Powell and 
Yawson, 2005, 
2007. 
Block holders Large shareholders 
facilitate takeovers as 
they can split gains on 
their own shares with the 
bidder.  
Dummy which takes a 
value of one if a firm has a 
significant shareholder 
(i.e., an institutional 
investor holding five 
percent or more of the 
firm’s shares) in the 90 
trading days before June of 
each year, and a value of 
zero otherwise. 
Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; 
Cremers et al., 
2009. 
Price 
momentum and 
trading volume 
Short-term price 
momentum and trading 
volume captures active 
trading in takeover 
targets prior to takeover 
bids.  
Price momentum is the t-
statistic of a trend line 
slope fitted to logged daily 
stock prices over the 90 
trading days before June of 
each year. Trading volume 
is the proportion of 
outstanding shares traded 
over the 90 trading days to 
June each year. 
Brar et al., 2009. 
Market 
sentiment 
A firm might have the 
characteristics of a target 
but might not receive a 
bid due to poor market 
conditions or economic 
sentiment.  
Dummy which takes a 
value of one when the 
FTSE ALL share index 
reports a positive return in 
each year to June, and a 
value of zero otherwise. 
Brar et al., 2009. 
Merger 
rumours 
A substantial number of 
takeovers are preceded 
by rumours; these 
rumours explain part of 
the documented pre-bid 
target price run-up. 
Rumour dummy takes a 
value of one if a merger bid 
is preceded by a rumour, 
and a value of zero 
otherwise.  
Jindra and 
Walking, 2004; 
Siganos, 2013; 
Siganos and 
Papa, 2015; 
Pound and 
Zeckhauser, 
1990. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
  Full Sample 
 
Targets 
 
Non-targets 
 
Difference 
Variable  Mean  SD   Mean  SD   Mean  SD   p-value 
ROCE 0.118 0.544   0.118 0.544   0.068 0.725   (0.007)*** 
AER -0.018 0.048   -0.018 0.048   -0.012 0.051   (0.000)*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.666 1.266   1.666 1.266   1.860 1.865   (0.000)*** 
Sales growth 0.307 1.300   0.307 1.300   0.330 1.332   (0.513) 
Liquidity 0.122 0.159   0.122 0.159   0.144 0.181   (0.000)*** 
Leverage 0.628 1.710   0.628 1.710   0.512 1.642   (0.005)*** 
GR mismatch 0.247 0.431   0.247 0.431   0.263 0.440   (0.165) 
Disturbance 0.203 0.402   0.203 0.402   0.210 0.408   (0.474) 
Firm size 18.169 1.795   18.169 1.795   17.813 2.192   (0.000)*** 
Free cash flow 0.000 0.161   0.000 0.161   -0.054 0.311   (0.000)*** 
Tangible assets 0.341 0.264   0.341 0.264   0.321 0.250   (0.001)*** 
Firm age 30.465 31.701   30.465 31.701   31.904 32.746   (0.089)* 
Notes:  
This table reports descriptive statistics of predictive variables for the full sample, all targets and all non-targets. ROCE is 
the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. AER (average excess returns) is computed as a firm’s average monthly 
excess return over the market (FTSE All Share) return for the year to June. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to book 
value of assets. SGrowth (sales growth) is the percentage of change in total revenue from the previous period. Liquidity is 
the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a 
value of one when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources, and a value of zero 
otherwise. IDDummy (industry disturbance dummy) takes a value of one if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a 
value of zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow (operating 
cash flow minus capital investments) to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Firm age is the number of years since incorporation. The p-value for the difference in variable 
means for targets and non-targets is shown in the last column.  * and *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of firm takeover likelihood 
 Coefficient p-value ROCE 0.087 (0.171) 
AER -3.552*** (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.062** (0.011) 
Sales growth 0.002 (0.922) 
Liquidity -0.389* (0.065) 
Leverage 0.025 (0.134) 
GR mismatch 0.018 (0.789) 
Disturbance -0.057 (0.421) 
Firm size 0.020 (0.181) 
Free cash flow 0.973*** (0.000) 
Tangible assets 0.389*** (0.001) 
Firm age -0.004*** (0.000) 
Constant -2.840*** (0.000) 
Observations  18,794  
McFadden's Adj R2 0.011  
Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.017  
LR Chi2 128.558*** (0.000) 
 Notes:  
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the conventional binomial logit model estimated 
using our full data set (1988-2009). For predictions, the model coefficients are re-estimated in a 
recursive manner and used to predict targets one year in advance. The dependent variable in the 
model is takeover probability (bivariate), and the independent variables are the prediction 
hypotheses. ROCE is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. AER (average excess 
returns) is computed as a firm’s average monthly excess return over the market (FTSE All Share) 
return for the year to June. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to book value of assets. 
SGrowth (sales growth) is the percentage of change in total revenue from the previous period. 
Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s 
debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of one when there is a mismatch between a firm’s 
growth opportunities and its resources, and a value of zero otherwise. IDDummy (industry 
disturbance dummy) takes a value of one if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry, and a value of 
zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash 
flow (operating cash flow minus capital investments) to total assets. Tangible assets is the ratio 
of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Firm age is the number of years since 
incorporation. P-values (corrected for clustering by firm and year) are presented in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Risk-adjusted returns 
 
Target 
portfolio 
All  
targets 
Targets in 
target 
portfolio 
All non-
targets 
Non-
targets  in 
target 
portfolio 
Predicted 
non-targets 
(Q1) 
Non-targets 
in Q1 
 
 
Month of 
rumour 
 
Month 
after 
rumour 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CAPM alpha 0.004 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.000 0.003 -0.005* -0.006* 0.007 -0.007 
 (0.191) (0.000) (0.000) (0.945) (0.352) (0.064) (0.050) (0.505) (0.401) 
FF3F alpha 0.003* 0.012*** 0.014*** -0.001 0.002 -0.005*** -0.008*** 0.003 -0.008 
 
(0.099) (0.000) (0.000) (0.476) (0.299) (0.005) (0.000) (0.797) (0.156) 
Market BHAR 0.002** 0.011*** 0.012*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.000 
 
(0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.232) (0.280) (0.319) (0.310) (0.736) (0.462) 
Size BHAR 0.002 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.614) (0.334) (0.315) (0.843) (0.263) 
BTM BHAR 0.002* 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.407) (0.347) (0.335) (0.862) (0.372) 
Size & BTM BHAR 0.001 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.187) (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.840) (0.369) (0.340) (0.951) (0.422) 
 
Notes:  
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-generation factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and 
Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama and French, 1992) models. The models are specified as follows: 
                                          CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖)                            FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑖  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑖 – 𝑅𝑅𝑖), where 𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝑅𝑖 is the risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include 
RM - RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, in addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by Gregory et 
al. (2013). The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly 
excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped skewness-adjusted p-values are 
also computed as specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use alternative benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market 
(BTM) benchmark and a combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) presents results for the full portfolio of predicted targets, (2) 
presents results for a portfolio of all targets in the sample,  (3) presents results obtained by eliminating all non-targets from the target portfolio, (4) presents results for a portfolio of all 
non-targets in the sample, (5) presents results obtained by eliminating all targets from the target portfolio, (6) presents results for a portfolio of predicted non-targets, i.e. the quintile 
of firms with the lowest takeover likelihood (Q1), and (7) presents results obtained by eliminating all the actual targets from Q1. Models (8) and (9) show results obtained for rumour-
screened portfolios. In (8), returns are calculated from the beginning of the month in which the rumour emerges, while in (9) returns are calculated from the beginning of the month 
after the rumour emerges. P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4 
Suggested strategies and risk-adjusted returns to portfolios of predicted targets (PTs) 
 
Excl. PTs 
which go 
bankrupt 
Excl. PTs 
with Z 
Scores  
Q1 
Excl. PTs 
with Z 
Scores  
Q1, Q2 
Value-
weighted 
returns of 
PTs 
Excl. 
PTs 
with 
MV 
Q1 
Excl. 
PTs with 
MV 
Q1, Q2 
Excl. PTs 
with 
leverage  
Q5 
Excl. PTs 
with 
leverage 
Q4, Q5 
Excl. PTs 
with 
liquidity 
Q1 
Excl. PTs 
with 
liquidity  
Q1, Q2 
Strategies 
(6), (8) & 
(10) 
combined 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CAPM alpha 0.006** 0.005* 0.006* -0.001** 0.004 0.005 0.005** 0.007** 0.005 0.006* 0.009** 
 
(0.024) (0.091) (0.052) (0.013) (0.264) (0.105) (0.049) (0.013) (0.103) (0.053) (0.021) 
FF3F alpha 0.005*** 0.004** 0.005*** -0.001*** 0.002 0.004** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.005** 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (0.212) (0.044) (0.009) (0.001) (0.031) (0.012) (0.007) 
Market BHAR 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002* 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.080) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size BHAR 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.043) (0.000) (0.002) (0.021) (0.263) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
BTM BHAR 0.004** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.014) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.133) (0.000) (0.013) (0.019) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Size & BTM  0.002 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001 0.002** 0.003** 0.004** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
BHAR (0.163) (0.005) (0.006) (0.046) (0.598) (0.032) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.007) (0.009) 
 
Notes: 
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-generation factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and 
Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama and French, 1992) models. The models are specified as follows: 
                                          CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖)                            FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑖  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑖 – 𝑅𝑅𝑖), where 𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝑅𝑖 is the risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include 
RM - RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, in addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by Gregory et 
al. (2013). The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly 
excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped skewness-adjusted p-values are 
also computed as specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use alternative benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market 
(BTM) benchmark and a combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) shows the returns to target portfolios when all actual 
bankrupt firms are excluded from target portfolios (TPs). Models (2) and (3) show results when firms with Taffler Z scores in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively 
(i.e., low Taffler Z scores), are excluded from TPs. Model (4) shows results when predicted targets are value-weighted when forming TPs. Models (5) and (6) show results when firms 
with market capitalisation in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively, are excluded from TPs. Models (7) and (8) show results when firms with leverage in the fifth, then 
fourth and fifth, quintile(s), respectively, are excluded. Models (9) and (10) show results when firms with liquidity in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively, are 
excluded. In Model (11), we exclude firms with size quintiles 1 and 2, liquidity quintiles 1 and 2, and leverage quintiles 4 and 5. P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Suggested strategies and risk-adjusted returns to portfolios of predicted targets (PTs) – Augmented model 
 
Target 
portfolio 
 
Excl. PTs 
which go 
bankrupt 
Excl. PTs 
with Z 
Scores  
Q1, Q2 
Value-weighted 
stock returns of 
PTs 
Excl. PTs 
with MV 
Q1, Q2 
Excl. PTs with 
leverage Q4, 
Q5 
Excl. PTs with 
liquidity  Q1, 
Q2 
Strategies 
(5), (6) & (7) 
combined 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAPM alpha 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005* 0.005 0.008** 
 
(0.567) (0.126) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.144) (0.042) 
FF3F alpha 0.001 0.003** 0.003 -0.003*** 0.002 0.004** 0.004* 0.007** 
 
(0.686) (0.041) (0.111) (0.000) (0.228) (0.028) (0.070) (0.017) 
Market BHAR -0.000 0.004*** 0.002** 0.000 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.007** 
 
(0.873) (0.000) (0.035) (0.888) (0.012) (0.205) (0.023) (0.011) 
Size BHAR -0.000 0.004*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.005** 
 
(0.669) (0.000) (0.037) (0.803) (0.201) (0.177) (0.068) (0.038) 
BTM BHAR -0.000 0.004*** 0.001 0.000 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.006** 
 
(0.725) (0.000) (0.103) (0.837) (0.017) (0.284) (0.022) (0.024) 
Size & BTM -0.000 0.003*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.005** 
BHAR (0.764) (0.000) (0.055) (0.934) (0.239) (0.115) (0.087) (0.039) 
 
Notes:  
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-generation factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and 
Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama and French, 1992) models. The models are specified as follows: 
                                          CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖)                            FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑖  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑖 – 𝑅𝑅𝑖), where 𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝑅𝑖 is the risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include RM - 
RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, in addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). 
The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on 
the calendar-time portfolio is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped skewness-adjusted p-values are also computed as 
specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use alternative benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market (BTM) benchmark and 
a combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) presents results obtained for the augmented model. Model (2) shows the returns to the 
target portfolios when all actual bankrupt firms are excluded from target portfolios (TPs). Model (3) shows results when firms with Taffler Z scores in the first and second quintiles (i.e., 
low Taffler Z scores) are excluded from TPs. Model (4) shows results when predicted targets are value-weighted when forming TPs. Model (5) shows results when firms with market 
capitalisation in the first and second quintiles are excluded from TPs. Model (6) shows results when firms with leverage in the fourth and fifth quintiles are excluded. Model (7) shows 
results when firms with liquidity in the first, then first and second, quintile(s), respectively, are excluded. In Model (8), we exclude firms with size quintiles 1 and 2, liquidity quintiles 1 
and 2, and leverage quintiles 4 and 5. P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Additional analysis: Risk-adjusted returns to alternative strategies 
 
Industry-adjusted 
Model 
 
Multinomial Model 
(Cash) 
 
Hedge 
strategy 
 
Target 
portfolio 
Screened 
portfolio 
 
Target 
portfolio 
Screened 
portfolio 
 
Screened 
portfolio 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) 
CAPM alpha 0.001 0.003 
 
0.003 0.008** 
 
0.009** 
 
(0.604) (0.339) 
 
(0.260) (0.044) 
 
(0.019) 
FF3F alpha 0.000 0.002 
 
0.002 0.006** 
 
0.009** 
 
(0.915) (0.403) 
 
(0.202) (0.018) 
 
(0.020) 
Market BHAR -0.000 0.002 
 
0.001 0.007*** 
 
0.014*** 
 
(0.829) (0.285) 
 
(0.287) (0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
Size BHAR -0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 0.006*** 
 
0.010*** 
 
(0.254) (0.668) 
 
(0.317) (0.009) 
 
(0.000) 
BTM BHAR -0.000 0.002 
 
0.001 0.007*** 
 
0.013*** 
 
(0.611) (0.327) 
 
(0.452) (0.006) 
 
(0.000) 
Size & BTM BHAR -0.002* 0.001 
 
0.001 0.005** 
 
0.010*** 
 
(0.061) (0.611) 
 
(0.241) (0.027) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Notes:  
This table presents alphas (intercepts) for cross-sectional regressions of portfolio monthly returns on return-
generation factors in the Capital Assets Pricing (CAPM: Sharpe, 1964) and Fama & French Three-Factor (FF3F: Fama 
and French, 1992) models. The models are specified as follows; 
 CAPM: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖)  
 FF3F: (𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖) + 𝛾𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 𝜏ℎ𝑚𝑚𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑖  
The dependent variable is (𝑅𝑖𝑖 – 𝑅𝑅𝑖), where 𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the equal-weighted return of the specified portfolio and 𝑅𝑅𝑖 is the 
risk-free rate. The independent variables in the models include RM - RF (excess market return), for the CAPM, and, 
in addition, SMB (size factor) and HML (book-to-market factor) for the FF3F. UK data for these factors is provided by 
Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio holding period is 180 months, from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the 
constant term provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time 
portfolio is zero. For the same portfolios, monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and their bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted p-values are also computed as specified in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). We use 
alternative benchmark portfolios, including Market benchmark, Size benchmark, book-to-market (BTM) benchmark 
and a combination of size and book-to-market (Size & BTM) benchmark to compute BHARs. Model (1) shows the 
returns to corresponding target portfolios when all variables in the conventional model (except dummy variables) 
are scaled by their 4-digit SIC code industry average. Model (2) shows returns to target portfolios (Model 1) screened 
for size, leverage and liquidity. The screening involves eliminating all firms with market values in the first and 
second quintiles, leverage in the fourth and fifth quintiles and liquidity in the first and second quintiles. Model (3) 
shows the returns to corresponding target portfolios derived by using a multinomial model which predicts targets 
by method of payment. The target portfolio in this case constitutes the 20 percent of firms with the highest likelihood 
of receiving a cash bid in each year. Model (4) show returns to Model (3) when the portfolios are further screened for 
size, leverage and liquidity, as discussed above. Model (5) presents results for the conventional model when a hedge 
strategy is applied to screened portfolios. This hedge strategy involves screening the target portfolios by size, 
liquidity and leverage, as above, then short-selling firms with low market values (Q1 and Q2), high leverage (Q4 and 
Q5) and low liquidity (Q1 and Q2). P-values are shown in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Proportion of targets and bankrupt firms in predicted target portfolios 
 
Notes:  
This figure summarises the performance of the prediction model in out-of-sample analyses between 1995 and 2009. 
Concentration refers to the proportion of non-targets, bankrupt and target firms within portfolios of predicted targets. 
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Figure 2 
Bid announcement dates and stock returns 
 
Panel A: The distribution of target bid announcement dates 
 
Panel B: Cumulative market-adjusted returns to targets around bid announcements 
 
Notes:  
This figure shows the timing and stock market reaction to takeover bids. The analysis is based on all takeover targets 
in the sample with available data. Panel A shows the distribution of bid announcement months from July to June. 
Panel B presents cumulative abnormal monthly returns earned during the period starting twelve months prior to 
(month -12) and ending twelve months after (Month 12) the bid announcement month (month 0). The analysis 
employs event study methodology to compute the market-adjusted monthly returns to targets around the 
announcement period.  
9%
6%
10
%
.
7%
9%
4%
8%
5%
3%
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y o
f b
ids
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Month of bid
20
%
10
%
0
-1
0%
-2
0%
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 m
on
thl
y a
bn
or
ma
l re
tur
ns
-10 -5 0 5 10
Months around the event
50 
 
 
Figure 3 
Cumulative abnormal returns and takeover likelihood 
  
Notes:  
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns to targets in Quintile 1 (predicted non-targets) and Quintile 5 
(predicted targets) around the merger announcement day. Returns are tracked for the month (or 20 trading days) 
leading up to the bid. Quintile 1 (Quintile 5) represents the 20 percent of firms with the lowest (highest) takeover 
probability. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the difference between stock returns and market returns during 
a particular day. These returns are then averaged across the firms in the portfolio to obtain the portfolio’s abnormal 
returns.  
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Figure 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns and merger rumours  
 
Notes:  
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns (1) around rumours, for all rumoured targets in target portfolios; (2) 
around rumours, for all rumoured targets in the target portfolio that eventually receive a takeover bid; and (3) around 
merger bids, for all rumoured targets in target portfolios. That is, (2) and (3) plot the rumour returns and eventual bid 
announcement returns, respectively, for bids which are preceded by merger rumours. The target portfolios represent 
the 20 percent of firms with the highest takeover probability. Returns are tracked for the month (or 20 trading days) 
leading up to, and the month after, the rumour emergence or bid announcement day (day 0). Daily abnormal returns 
are computed as the difference between stock returns and market returns during a particular day. These returns are 
then averaged across the portfolio to obtain the portfolio’s abnormal returns.  
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